INTRODUCTION
The chemotherapy dose required by the 1994 experimental breast cancer protocol was already high. Then, the Dana-Faber Cancer Institute administered four times that dosage to Betsy Lehman, the health columnist for the Boston Globe. Lehman died within days. For two months the hospital did not realize that the overdose had caused her death. 1 The media coverage was relentless, and its effect was electric. People felt that if this horrific botch was possible at Dana-Farber, it was possible anywhere. As one leader in the struggle against medical error put it, Betsy Lehman's death was "Patient Safety's Chernobyl." 2 The Lehman tragedy accelerated the recognition that most medical errors are (like the Chernobyl meltdown) system errors, not the result of a solitary practitioner's mistake.
That re-orientation led to action. Massachusetts moved toward building its health system's capacity for learning-for looking beyond blame for tragedies and focusing on preventing recurrence. The Massachusetts Legislature created a state agency, 3 the Betsy Lehman Patient Safety Center, with the mission of understanding the hidden system-based sources of error. The Lehman Center's enabling statute provides a "safe harbor" where information gathered about patient safety events can be protected: statements, documents, and other materials provided during participation in the Center's investigations are not available from the Center for use in related civil or administrative proceedings. 4 The Center provides a platform for "forward-looking accountability" aimed at cutting future risk, not at apportioning blame. 5 Now, Massachusetts has seen 30,000 criminal convictions overturned after the exposure of faked drug test results supplied by two state chemists, Annie Dookhan and Sonja Farak. 6 Alone, every faked test created the possibility of an extended pretrial detention, a wrongful conviction, a prison term, a criminal record, a dismembered family-a wrecked life. Aggregated, the faked tests created a certainty of tens of thousands of "wrongful dismissals" and failed prosecutions. (Counterfeit drug "false positives" among the 30,000 must have been far outnumbered by genuine drug cases that the lab frauds required terminating.)
THE SAFETY PERSPECTIVE ON PUBLIC SAFETY
Criminal justice in the United States is primarily a state and local enterprise and most (if not all) states and localities have experienced some disturbing outcomes. Harris County, Texas, for example, has experienced its own lab scandals. 7 Elsewhere, the innocent are wrongly 3. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 12C, § 15 (2018). 4. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 12C, § 15(e) (2018) . "The information collected by the Lehman center or reported to the Lehman center shall not be a public record as defined in section 7 of chapter 4, shall be confidential and shall not be subject to subpoena or discovery or introduced into evidence in any judicial or administrative proceeding, except as otherwise specifically provided by law." This provision does not affect the availability of information from traditional sources even when it is also submitted to the Center. convicted while the real perpetrators go free; dangerous prisoners are mistakenly released and then kill again; avoidable "suicide-by-cop" fatalities traumatize families and frontline police. Beneath these frontpage spectacles a submerged universe of coerced misdemeanor 8 plea bargains, protracted pretrial detentions, failed re-entry plans, fruitless street stops, "near-misses," declining "closure rates" and "high frequency, low impact" events of all kinds erode public security and trust in the law.
Could these disasters serve as local "Public Safety Chernobyls" and lead toward the same forward-looking reforms that followed Betsy Lehman's death? Can we develop "Criminal Justice Safety Centers" that follow the Lehman Center example, and build the capacity-one that is now strikingly lacking-to analyze criminal justice disasters collaboratively and learn their lessons, insulated from litigation's unpredictable cross-currents of liability, immunity, indemnification, and reciprocal blaming? Still, there is an embryonic Model that will repay our attention in the context of "wrongful acquittals," wrongful convictions, and other less spectacular miscarriages of justice. It will not function as a blueprint for organizing ideological life in the Packer manner, but it can provide a reminder that there is another-and potentially paradigm-shifting-way of looking at things.
The last decade has seen a growing interest 14 in a criminal justice orientation derived from a deep reservoir of literature and experience 15 that high-risk fields such as aviation and medicine 16 have tapped to develop "cultures of safety." 17 The fact that safety concepts are so easily borrowed from other fields probably explains why there have been few efforts to denominate an explicit "Safety Model" in criminal justice.
18
But by now it is easy to list books, articles, and compilations that introduce the basic safety concepts to criminal justice practice JUST., https://www.nij.gov/topics/justicesystem/Pages/sentinel-events-bibliography.aspx. In collaboration with the Bureau of Justice Assistance, NIJ is currently funding technical assistance for an array of state and local collaborations that are organizing and evaluating allstakeholder "Sentinel Event Learning Reviews." This effort to shift focus from blame for past miscarriages to cutting the risk of future repetitions is discussed infra notes 106-110 and accompanying text.
18. But see Boaz Sangero, Safety from Plea-Bargains' Hazards, 38 PACE L. REV. 301 (2018) (calling for application of a particular "System-Theoretic Accident Model and Processes" to plea bargain dangers).
communities. 19 The National Institute of Justice (NIJ), has given this interest practical form through its "Sentinel Events Initiative" by conducting a sustained investigation of the potential for mobilizing safety thinking in non-blaming, all-stakeholders, "forward-looking" learning reviews after unexpected justice events.
20
The safety at issue here is everyone's safety: the safety of crime victims, defendants, and communities-even the safety of law enforcement personnel 21 and legal system practitioners. 22 This wider safety perspective escapes the zero-sum ideology of the Crime Control versus Due Process dialectic in which anything protecting an individual's rights automatically threatens potential crime victims to an equal extent. It recognizes the impact of iatrogenic 23 ("from the treatment") injury inflicted by hyper-aggressive "stop, question, and frisk" programs, re-traumatizing victim interviews, mass incarceration, 24 and other interventions, and requires that those harms be weighed in the balance before making criminal justice choices, not deferred to be deplored at some later date. wrongful convictions and mistaken releases are system errors: "organizational accidents." In this conception, miscarriages of justice result from small mistakes and decisions-none of which are independently sufficient to cause the event-that combine with each other and with latent system weaknesses, which only then cause harm. This approach applies to a whole range of errors, including the unspectacular: "cold cases" that stay cold too long, fruitless stops and frisks, avoidable shootings of or by police, distended sentences for trivial violations, and "near miss" and "good catch" events where disaster was averted at the last moment by special skill or good luck.
30
The safety paradigm, as Richard Leo notes, can:
Move us beyond individual or single-cause explanations of wrongful convictions to more systemic and etiological ones that emphasize routine mistakes, feedback loops, reciprocal impacts, interaction effects, latent conditions, and cumulative error, among other factors to more accurately understand the causes and cures of wrongful convictions.
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To the question "who is accountable?," safety commentators would answer, "everyone involved, to one degree or another, if not by acting themselves, then by failing to anticipate or intercept another's action." "Everyone" in this context includes individuals far from the scene of the event who did the hiring and training, set the caseloads, shaped the jurisprudence, imposed the budgets, and created the environment for the sharp-end actors. Dr. Lucien Leape, one of the pioneers in the patient CARRANO 30. See Starr, A New Way to Reform the Judicial System, supra note 14 (describing Philadelphia "sentinel events" review of homicide in which it was discovered that wrong men had been held for six months pretrial). 31. Leo, supra note 17, at 97.
safety movement, summarized this perspective: "While an operator error may be the proximate "cause" of the accident, the root causes were often present within the system for a long time. The operator has, in a real sense, been "set up" to fail by poor design, faulty maintenance, or erroneous management decisions."
32
Would we think differently about things if we kept the safety perspective in mind?
THE SAFETY PERSPECTIVE AND DIAGNOSING UNSAFE OUTCOMES
Correcting individual errors (for example, by closing a "cold case" or exonerating a prisoner) and addressing prospectively the systemic weaknesses leading to those errors are two different tasks. 33 The wider lens provided by safety thinking advances both of those efforts, although in different ways. The potential impact on identifying past errors is less direct and more modest than the impact on preventing future harms, and it is felt only one case at a time. Even so, it is real, and should not be ignored.
The legal system's treatment of miscarriages of justice-known or alleged, completed or looming-traditionally employs a streamlined approach to cause and effect. It isolates a single defective component of the system, sometimes human (for example, a prosecutor who hides exculpatory evidence, or a technician who "dry labs" an evidence sample) and sometimes technical (for example, an unscientific forensic technique, or a faulty communications link) and treats it as the cause.
34
That cause determines a definite effect, just as a defective spring or gear in the clockwork would dictate failure in a wristwatch. For example, the Swedish Supreme Court ruled that if one nurse had more carefully doublechecked a particular medication order before preparing it (mistakenly at ten times the intended dose) a three-month-old baby would not have died. Such condensed, highly focused accounts that converge on one (in)action by one person (the "eureka part") give componential models of failure a societal legitimacy that keeps reproducing and instantiating Newtonian physics.").
Media accounts of criminal justice malfunctions reinforce this view because they are obsessed with identifying villains (the racist, triggerhappy cop who shoots the civilian) or fools (the naïve judge who releases the murderous juvenile). 35 So does the rhetoric of appellate opinions that isolate a culpable cause, then gauge its prejudicial effect. Occasionally, when the failures of more than one component (the lab technician and then the prosecutor and then the defender) are noticed, the causal language in the appellate opinion or news story moves from "simple" to "complicated." Even in those cases, however, the relationship between the "causes" is described as linear and sequential, and the relationship between the proximate cause and the harm is seen as determinative: x happened, and so therefore, y followed, and z followed from that.
36 This "complicated" version can be fully captured by devices such as a timeline, a "Fishbone Diagram," 37 or a "Swiss Cheese Diagram."
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Contemporary safety writers 39 argue that human interaction with even a simple system very quickly introduces uncertainty, adaptation, and complexity. Once the humans are involved, cause and effect relationships are no longer linear (as in a machine); for every act there can be an unlimited number of effects. 40 A jet airliner is an immensely complicated machine, but jet air liners in operation " [B] ecome complex because they are opened up to influences that lie way beyond engineering specifications and reliability predictions." 41 The production of these effects is not determinate, as throwing a switch would be; it is probabilistic. For example, the decision to use a "simultaneous" lineup technique in which the suspect and fillers are displayed together may generate more "false hit" identifications of an innocent suspect than a "sequential" (one photo at a time) technique, but it does not produce a false hit; it raises the odds in favor of one. 42 false hit may, in turn, increase the probability that "tunnel vision" cognitive bias in investigators will be triggered. 43 Huge caseloads or intense media pressure may increase the likelihood that the tunnel vision cognitive bias is augmented and alternative suspects or contradictory narratives are disregarded rather than appropriately sought and evaluated.
But these factors will not require those outcomes. They are "influences" rather than "causes" in the routine legal sense. 44 They do not act in sequence; they are acting together, and on each other, simultaneously. A decision by a cop, or a prosecutor, or a defender, or a judge may often seem to be a cause, but it is certainly always an effect: every decision is the outcome of the practitioners' struggles to make sense of the swirling influences that are acting on them. The practitioner's situation during patrol, or investigation, or litigation is dynamic and adaptive, not static and schematic. The presence of any particular influence does not guarantee failure in every case, nor does its absence guarantee safety. This recognition can help to repair a blind spot in the re-evaluations of investigations, prosecutions, convictions, and other processes.
The tight focus on Newtonian scenarios of cause-and-effect channels inquiry and investigation, and it can obscure the fact that a mistake has been made whenever no single, glaring, independently sufficient cause presents itself. The identification of some "smoking gun" cause becomes a triage criterion for the hard-pressed practitioners who must investigate and prepare claims: it is treated as a prerequisite not only to a finding of error, but to the commitment of time and resources required in looking for one. 45 Unless someone can point to a distinct violation with an inevitable product, the harm is not likely to be recognized in any practical sense. Adherence to the everyday causation model leads quickly to a dead end in investigations of possible miscarriages of justice.
But the safety perspective opens a supplemental window on legally significant narratives by explaining how-even without the independently sufficient "smoking gun"-slips and errors occur, cascade, and cumulate until an unforeseen result takes its toll. 46 Starting from the hypothesis that the result is mistaken with this complex etiology in mind can help to imagine a path of "locally rational" but mistaken decisions and reveal the likelihood that an error has occurred either in convicting or eliminating a suspect. A "within-policy" wrongful conviction or solvable yet still unsolved "cold case" in which everyone followed the rules as the rules then stood and took only those risks that were regarded as "acceptable" is perfectly possible given the potential for human error built into the investigative process and the unreliability of the legal system's diagnostic capabilities. 47 Even so, retrospectively uncovering individual mistakes is only the beginning of the Safety Model's potential contribution.
THE PREVENTION POTENTIAL IN FORWARD-LOOKING ACCOUNTABILITY
No system can survive without disciplining its conscious rulebreakers, and enthusiasts for the "non-blaming" approach to safety reviews have to keep that fact in mind. 48 Certainly, the Massachusetts drug lab scandals, for example, make it very clear that there really are "bad apples" in the criminal justice system, and that there is nothing wrong with dismissing and prosecuting them. 49 In fact, public trust in the system can depend to an important degree on the punishment of insider misconduct. But those debacles also make it clear that the punishment of culpable individuals is a bad place to stop.
One of the Safety Model's maxims is that it is insufficient to go "down and in" to understand an event; you must also go "up and out" to appreciate the environment that motivated the proximate human agent. 49. An extensive body of commentary addresses how (and by whom) the line between disciplinary and educational reviews should be drawn as organizations strive to institute a "Just Culture" that allows for workers' participation in addressing safety challenges. See, e.g., Standing to the left of Annie Dookhan and Sonja Farak were the people who hired them, trained them, supervised them, and devised the laboratory evidence handling protocols they blithely skated around.
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Standing to their right was a legion of lab directors and legal system practitioners-prosecutors, defenders, and judges-who failed (throughout the disposition of 30,000 cases) to notice that anything was amiss.
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It is easy to see how Dookhan and Farak crippled the work of Massachusetts prosecutors and defenders downstream, but it is important to remember that their awareness of the ramshackle state of the downstream inspection apparatus influenced the upstream choices of the two "bad apples." 53 Besides, simultaneously battering all of these players was an encompassing environment of acute caseload pressures and dire resource shortages that generated the culture of "workarounds," triage, and "covert work rules" that made it both attractive and possible for Dookhan and Farak to zig when they should have zagged.
54
Safety experts would say that the criminal justice scandals that excite media attention are actually proof that Murphy's Law is mistaken: that everything that could go wrong usually goes right, and that we then draw the mistaken conclusion that the absence of visible disaster is proof of safety.
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That insight echoes an observation of Dr. Donald Berwick, one of the pioneers of the patient safety movement: "Every defect a treasure." 56 Berwick's contention would be that whether or not there is someone to hang after a known miscarriage of justice, there is a great deal that can be learned about preventing recurrence: that there are always many important features revealed that would have stayed hidden if the event had not exploded.
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The masked state of these dangers is in the nature of things. As safety expert Sidney Dekker noted:
ecisions that are seen as 'bad decisions' after the accident (even though they seemed like perfectly acceptable ideas at the time) are seldom big, risky steps. Rather, there is a long and steady 51. Solotaroff, supra note 6. 52. In at least two cases involving Assistant Attorneys General who were notified of the lab errors, the lawyers allegedly worked to cover up the extent of the problem. Id progression of small, incremental steps that unwittingly take an operation toward its boundaries. Each step away from the original norm that meets with empirical success (and no obvious sacrifice of safety) is used as the next basis from which to depart just that little bit more. It is this incrementalism that makes distinguishing the abnormal from the normal so difficult. If the difference between what 'should be done' (or what was done successfully yesterday) and what is done successfully today is minute, then this slight departure from an earlier established norm is not worth remarking or reporting on. 58 An exclusively disciplinary concentration will drive reports of variations further underground. No one wants to become enmeshed in an unpredictable punitive process with potentially disastrous and disproportionate impacts on themselves or co-workers. The Safety Model reminds us that frontline operators are rarely driven by ideological fealty to Crime Control or Due Process models; they are just trying to get through their days, in jobs constructed for them by others. The safety that preoccupies them during those days is their own safety. 59 Paradoxically, the events that at first seem most responsive to "Bad Apple" analyses provide the clearest illustration of the distinctive efficacy of the safety approach. Take, for example, a trial prosecutor concealing evidence of innocence in a wrongful conviction case. 60 After an exoneration such as that of John Thompson, 61 who spent decades on death row after a prosecutor hid exculpatory lab tests and withheld information about an incentivized witness (who may have been the actual killer), our tendency is to react with rage: to call for prosecution, disbarment, or civil damages-exorcise the culprit, and leave it at that. Safety Model practice would encourage us to go further. It distinguishes a "performance review" of an individual from an "event review"
62 that provides a fuller learning platform.
Why was Thompson chosen in the first place? The Safety Model would prompt us to ask about the multiple failures both in the investigation that preceded the Thompson prosecutor's decision and in the adversarial inspection stage that followed it. The examination will 58 What levers in the prosecutor's environment influenced his behavior? The relative unlikelihood of discipline was probably one, but was it the only one? An absence of training? A straitened focus on conviction rates as the only measure of performance? Pressure from superiors or the media to deliver those "outputs"? What were the impacts of the need to persuade jurors to convict (or defendants to plead) on the cognitive frame the prosecutor employed?
66 Did the prosecutors' office culture generate informal "counterfactuals" ("He could have been guilty") that lessened the ethical price in the eyes of the prosecutor's peers? 67 Had withholding more and more exculpatory evidence in weaker and weaker cases become, by small increments, more and more normal? 
When a Presidential Commission examined the tragic space shuttle
Challenger launch decision it concluded that NASA managers and engineers had deviated from safety rules in order to meet a launch schedule dictated by political and budgetary pressures-in other words, the Commission placed the blame on individuals' moral and ethical laxity. 68 But when Diane Vaughan looked more closely at the tragedy from a safety perspective she demonstrated that "[i]t was conformity, not deviation, that caused the disaster"; 69 that the Challenger story was one of "incremental descent into poor judgment."
70 Everyone did pretty much what they thought they were expected to do: they accepted the organizational "acceptable risks." 71 The launch decision was "[A] mistake embedded in the banality of organizational life."
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A Safety Model assessment of the Thompson exoneration would not evade the fact that there was individual misconduct, but it would also ask whether John Thompson was the victim not only of a rogue prosecutor but of a criminal justice system that had replicated, in its own way, the culture of "structural secrecy" that Vaughan argued characterized NASA-a culture that kept secrets from itself, and produced a tragedy that no one wanted. 73 Is this a system that can be expected to do the same thing again?
The capacity of the Safety lens to reveal additional weaknesses at both the component level and system level can also be applied across the whole spectrum of iatrogenic harms flowing from police-citizen encounters that are usually understood (when they are examined at all) through a tightly focused assessment of the performance of the officer at the sharp end. There are police shootings in which the racial bias, explicit or implicit, of the officer who pulls the trigger is a glaring factor. 74 There are other events where an officer, actively menaced by an armed and mentally ill citizen who was bent on "suicide-by-cop," had no choice except to shoot. 75 There are "high frequency, low impact" events such as fruitless stops and frisks that humiliate law-abiding citizens. 76 When examined from a safety perspective with the goal of preventing recurrence, these familiar scenarios are not simple.
Even when a shooting is perpetrated by a racist cop there are safety questions remaining about the system's hiring, training, and supervision components. 77 Could he have been screened out? Were red flags missed during his career or in his off-duty life? Even assuming the cop was a racist, why did he shoot this time, but not the hundreds of other times when his racism would have been operating? Safety practice would distinguish the performance review of the individual from the event review that accounts for the confluent and cascading system influences that led to the death, and that might lead to another in the future.
Did the encounter have to occur in the first place? Studies show that traffic stops for equipment violations are heavily biased along racial lines. 78 They are dangerous to civilians (and, disproportionately to minority civilians) and they are dangerous to officers too. 79 So why do we insist at the department level on a practice of equipment violation stops when notice-to-owner programs could achieve similar results? Could everyone's safety be enhanced if the number of these events is reduced?
In safety terms, understanding a fatal police shooting of an acutely mentally ill citizen does not begin and end with the officer's final decision to fire, but pursues the etiological question of why these two individuals, in these mental states, and with this training, treatment, and equipment influencing them, met on this occasion. 80 What was the history of the deceased? How was the continuity of his treatment managed? What was the training of the officer? Of the dispatcher who sent him? Was the officer equipped with and trained in de-escalation and non-lethal options? Did the Department have a Crisis Intervention capability? Did fatigue, augmented by Departmental shift-work arrangements, affect the officer's decision-making? 81 Would any of these things, done differently, have produced a different result?
Further along the spectrum, a street stop-and-frisk of a blameless citizen on his or her way to work is a harm that could be analyzed if safety is what we have in mind. Assessing that coercive interaction purely on the basis of the decision of the cop who makes the stop is in safety terms radically incomplete. What factors combined to create this "high frequency low impact" harm? What influenced the decision? What departmental policy or practice shaped the street cop's prediction that he would find something if he stopped the citizen? Or convinced him that it didn't really matter very much whether he found something on this citizen or not: that any harm would be trivial?
82 Was the officer impacted by a CompStat quota that misused (or failed entirely to use) geo-spatial predictive resources?
The Safety Model also encourages us to see that the most obvious victims of miscarriages of justice are not the only victims. Certainly, John Thompson was a victim of a wrongful conviction, but his wrongful conviction harmed others too. The real murderer may have found further victims while Thompson served his time. Thompson's family was victimized; his conviction cheated the murder victim's family of whatever solace a just outcome would have provided, and the revelation of the miscarriage re-traumatized the family. Thompson's overmatched appointed defenders should certainly-like the NICU nurse who is the last person in the chain of delivery of the fatal overdose to an infant-be regarded as "second victims," 83 wounded by learning that they had failed to protect an innocent man from a death sentence.
A police officer who lives to walk away from the fatal shooting of a mentally ill citizen doesn't walk away unharmed, no matter how 83. DEKKER, THE SECOND VICTIM, supra note 62.
"within policy" the shooting might have been. The existential terror of the encounter, the trauma of the shooting, the legal jeopardy the shooting created, will all leave enduring wounds.
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The Safety Model captures intergenerational and community harms generated by criminal justice choices that are ordinarily not accounted for in the analysis of events. 85 The safety perspective comprehends that criminal justice is, as Angela Harris put it, "environmental justice," 86 and takes account of the radiating collateral damage the system produces.
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The Safety Model imports from industrial and medical practice a number of tested techniques (e.g., Root Cause Analysis, "Fishbone" diagrams, "Five Why" inquiries) that will improve the quantity of faulty components exposed and will also offer a new degree of precision in describing them. 88 It is virtually certain that by applying these tools the Safety Model approach will uncover multiple defects and that those defects will be present across many jurisdictions. We can have a more comprehensive catalog of component weaknesses and sites of harm-a longer "to-do" list of useful repairs. The Safety Model can improve practice incrementally in this way. A "Library," 89 or "Clearinghouse," 90 or "Database" 91 sharing reports of learning events can be an extremely useful resource.
But it would be a mistake to allow the multiplied insights these tools produce to be treated as the end product. The Safety Model warns that a preemptive focus on optimizing individual components provides a poor route to overall system safety. contributions to how events really unfold." 93 Any "fix" we generate this way will be subject to attack from its environment. Caseloads will rise, budgets will fall. Our "fix" will impact distant elements of the system in unanticipated ways, and adjustments made at those sites will then affect our site in turn. Inevitably, triage, "workarounds," and "covert work rules" will multiply on the frontlines. Safety specialists recognize that we will need a new "fix" tomorrow, and then another fix on the day after that.
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Criminal justice is an environment where nothing can really be "fixed" within an organizational silo, no matter how precise in technocratic terms its internal Root Cause Analysis or Fishbone Diagram may be. When (as in Camden, New Jersey) sixty-seven percent of the people who are arrested and involved in the criminal justice system also cycle through hospital emergency departments, it is not really possible to say which system is "upstream" and which is "downstream;" each is both upstream and downstream of the other. 95 Both are buffeted by external forces derived from budgets, drug epidemics, housing shortages, and economic disasters. Ultimately, safety (and its opposite) can no more be seen in a single component than "wetness" can be seen in a single molecule of H2O. Safety is an emergent quality that must be sought on the system level, and safety is not finally generated by discrete "fixes" to components in themselves, but by the cultivation and maintenance of a culture of continuous improvement. 97 Resiliency, not the permanent "fix," is the Safety Model's goal.
PARTICIPATION, COLLABORATION, RESTORATION
In the final paragraph of his magisterial The Collapse of American Criminal Justice, William Stuntz argued that:
The criminals we incarcerate are not some alien enemy. Nor, for that matter, are the police officers and prosecutors who seek to fight crime in those criminals' neighborhoods. Neither side of this divide binomial opposition of 'ours' and 'theirs' " 108 dominates this thinking, and a ratcheting effect takes hold, driving the authorities and the communities further apart. The conversation sinks to a level at which the question is defined as whether Black Lives Matter or whether Blue Lives Matter, as if the two were mutually exclusive. 109 Remembering the Safety Model perspective could offer us a way out of this trap.
To begin with, the safety perspective suggests that the fascination with control that animates the Crime Control and Due Process antagonists entangled in Packer's Battle Model is a detour. 110 Control may be a means to an end, but it is not an end in itself, and control (like safety itself) is at best evanescent, always fragile, and at times completely illusory. 111 In a racially and economically divided society, the blind pursuit of control for its own sake or as if it were the indispensable precondition to progress in any direction comes at a price, and it has proven destructive.
John Griffiths argued that Herbert Packer's Crime Control and Due Process Models were not really the polar opposites that Packer claimed, but were variant versions of a single "Battle Model," both predicated on a zero-sum contest carried out between an irreconcilable state and individual: an inevitable war in which one side wins, and one side loses. 112 To make his point Griffiths conjured up a contrasting "Family Model" derived from another institution in society that regularly hands out discipline and punishment but is built on a foundation of love and an assumption that the offending child and the disciplinarian parent will ultimately reconcile. 113 Griffiths also recounted the failed effort of the early juvenile justice reform movement to treat delinquency prosecutions as exercises in pursuing the best interests of the child: "the closest thing to a Family Model idea we have ever had in this country." 114 The juvenile court reform movement of the early twentieth century collapsed, Griffiths concluded, because "it was an idea imposed artificially upon an unchanged Battle Model substratum . . . A rhetorical abstraction of love was superimposed upon a reality of indifference, hostility, and ostracism."
115 The movement's result was a juvenile process that was simply the criminal process minus protections for the accused. 116 It might seem that a similar doom awaits any attempt at realizing a Safety Model in criminal justice. But although the Safety Model and the Family Model confront the same Battle Model culture, they encounter it from radically different angles. To begin with, the Safety Model's own central logic makes it clear that the Safety Model could never be imposed on frontline culture from on high (in the manner in which Griffiths' "Family Model" of juvenile justice was imposed) in the first place.
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The "culture of safety" that the Safety Model sketched in this Essay requires is by its nature collaborative and diverse: involving allstakeholders (at all ranks) and their array of perspectives. It is informed of current knowledge in the implicated fields, promotes the reporting of errors and "near misses," creates an atmosphere of trust for frontline workers, remains flexible in adapting to changing demands, and is willing and able to learn about the functioning of its own safety system.
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The Safety Model constitutes a wager on the frontline troops-it sees them as a resource, not as a menace. 119 It recognizes that the local motivations for practitioners' "workarounds" and "practical drift"-influences that would be repudiated as "excuses" in any retrospective disciplinary process-are an indispensable element of any forwardlooking inquiry aimed at preventing future harms. Safety must be "coproduced" by the officials and the communities working together to identify harms or it won't be produced at all, and it requires an understanding of the perspectives of all ranks, in all stakeholder roles. Just as the patient safety version of analyzing events includes the patient's family and the operating room nurse as well as the Chief of Surgery, the public safety incarnation must value the community and patrol officer perspectives as well as those of the Assistant Commissioner and the Chief Judge.
Besides, the Safety Model's interaction with the Battle Model staff is not about their violation of rules, or the generation of more rules. Its focus is not legality, but workmanship. 120 It accepts the reality that work, as designed and reflected in rules, is often not the same as the work as it must be performed, and it mobilizes operators' pride in their work to help bolster their individual senses of accountability for a just collective outcome. We expect our novices to simply follow the rules, but we expect our experts to deal with the unexpected, to innovate and improvise, even to ignore the rules when the situation demands it. 121 As Egon Bittner has written, "at its core workmanship consists of the ability to call upon resources of knowledge, skill, and judgement to meet and master the unexpected within one's sphere of competence." 122 The fact that there is no one to hang (or even that some individual has already been hung) for violating a pre-existing rule during a harmful event does not mean there is nothing to learn about improving workmanship. Discipline, prosecution, and civil damages will have to follow from specific particular violations in order to provide fair compensation and preserve public trust, but we do not have to stop there.
There is a range of criminal justice errors including wrongful convictions, mistaken street stops, and avoidable uses of force for which the "Battle Model substratum" Griffiths identified will not want to see its participants punished, as long as their acts are "legal," or perhaps unless they are flagrantly illegal. 123 The Crime Control perspective generally accepts these errors as a cost of doing business. 124 Still, the fact that there are law professors who can live contentedly with this utilitarian balancing of error costs does not prove that the people who actually work in criminal justice every day see these errors as desirable, nor want to repeat these outcomes if repetition can be avoided. 125 No one wants to play a role in convicting an innocent man and allowing the real perpetrator to go free. Likewise, no one wants to shoot a mentally ill civilian unnecessarily.
Avoiding these outcomes whenever you can is a source of pride on the frontlines, and working daily to prevent them becomes a matter of self-respect. Most criminal justice practitioners agree with James Reason's statement of safety thinking, which accepts error as a part of the human condition: "You cannot change the human condition, but you can change the conditions under which people work." 126 Changes to some work conditions will produce negligible results; changes to others are beyond the power of leadership. 127 But there are some changes to working conditions that will have meaningful impact on operations that can be felt quickly: these will improve the working lives of the people at the frontlines as well as the lives of their communities. 128 By participating in collaborative learning reviews of unexpected outcomes, criminal justice practitioners can communicate that they accept that they "are accountable to the community for meeting even those standards of adequate workmanship that cannot be formulated in advance, and explicitly." 129 They can enhance public trust in the law and system legitimacy by showing that they care about getting things right. There are differences between medicine and criminal justice, of course, but there is reason to hope that the healing that patients and their families experience when medicine includes them in its "disclosure and apology" 130 approach after a medical error can begin to be replicated for persons and communities harmed by criminal justice outcomes. Persons harmed value their inclusion in efforts to see that no one else experiences their suffering in the future.
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As things stand, the people most impacted by the justice system are least able to influence it. 132 The safety approach could construct a participatory platform where the value we as a society give to safe workmanship-in a version of workmanship that gives due weight to the benefits of systemization and standardization-can be expressed by taking account of its opposite, and of the right of community members to be free of unnecessary intrusions and curtailments.
Orderly adjudications of disciplinary proceedings cannot be conducted as all-stakeholders colloquies. In our existing processes, focused entirely on discipline and punishment, respect for the due process rights of the accused practitioner explains excluding, for example, civilian community representatives.
Learning-oriented reviews, on the other hand, provide a complementary avenue for the continuous community participation in criminal justice that can establish safety as a guiding principle, nourish interactions, build connections, cultivate young leaders, and create an environment where diversity and innovation can increase.
133 These reviews will generate, mobilize, and apply data. They will provide the "thick data" insights that complement the "big data" picture by accepting the complexity of events and revealing the social context of connections between data points. 134 These reviews will sometimes (although not always) generate answers to problems. Perhaps most importantly, they will always generate new questions-questions from one stakeholder to another, and from the group of stakeholders to the relevant fields of inquiry-that can be subjected to empirical inquiry and detailed analysis.
A SAFETY PLACE
If this safety work is worth doing, where and how can it be done?
The National Institute of Justice has been pursuing a methodical exploration of those questions since 2011. 135 Focused on a core concept of non-blaming, all-stakeholders, all-ranks, forward-looking reviews of incidents and events, the NIJ Sentinel Events Initiative has conducted a diverse Roundtable of stakeholders, 136 solicited and reported on three "beta" site learning review efforts, 137 convened community and "persons-harmed" sessions, and organized and disseminated the colloquies generated by an "all-stakeholders" gathering. 138 It is now poised, in collaboration with the Bureau of Justice Assistance, to provide technical assistance (through the Quattrone Center for the Fair Administration of Justice) to state and local coalitions who will develop individualized versions of the learning review processes. 139 The expectation is that a range of individualized adaptations will be developed, pursued, and evaluated.
These efforts will likely take many forms, but the Betsy Lehman Patient Safety Center offers an analogy for criminal justice safety activities and suggests one straightforward and distinctly "doable" approach from the array of possibilities. 140 It indicates that a place to do safety work is within reach for a quite modest investment. 141 The Betsy Lehman Center is a statewide agency with a small budget and a small professional staff. 142 With an equivalent staff available, a state center for criminal justice safety (maintained, for example, at a state university) could, on request, provide jurisdictions with a neutral moderator, process expertise and substantive experts from eventrelevant fields. It could manage documents and develop protocols for disseminating the event analyses generated by local participants, relieving smaller jurisdictions within a state of the need to maintain a standing review capacity locally.
A version of the Betsy Lehman Center's ability to afford confidentiality 143 to participants could also be an important element of the development of the criminal justice system's safety perspective, although perhaps not in the expected way.
